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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
he evaluation of teachers based on the contribution they make to 
the learning of their students, value-added, is an increasingly 
popular but controversial education reform policy.  We highlight 
and try to clarify four areas of confusion about value-added.  The first 
is between value-added information and the uses to which it can be 
put.  One can, for example, be in favor of an evaluation system that 
includes value-added information without endorsing the release to the 
public of value-added data on individual teachers.  The second is 
between the consequences for teachers vs. those for students of 
classifying and misclassifying teachers as effective or ineffective — the 
interests of students are not always perfectly congruent with those of 
teachers.  The third is between the reliability of value-added measures 
of teacher performance and the standards for evaluations in other 
fields — value-added scores for individual teachers turn out to be 
about as reliable as performance assessments used elsewhere for high 
stakes decisions.  The fourth is between the reliability of teacher 
evaluation systems that include value-added vs. those that do not — 
ignoring value-added typically lowers the reliability of personnel 
decisions about teachers.  We conclude that value-added data has an 
important role to play in teacher evaluation systems, but that there is 
much to be learned about how best to use value-added information in 
human resource decisions.  
 
Teacher evaluation at a crossroads 
The vast majority of school districts presently employ teacher evaluation systems 
that result in all teachers receiving the same (top) rating.  This is perhaps best 
exemplified by a recent report by the New Teacher Project focusing on thousands 
of teachers and administrators spanning twelve districts in four states.1  The report 
revealed that even though all the districts employed some formal evaluation 
process for teachers, all failed to differentiate meaningfully among levels of 
teaching effectiveness.  In districts that used binary ratings more than 99 percent of 
teachers were rated satisfactory.  In districts using a broader range of ratings, 94 
percent received one of the top two ratings and less than 1 percent received an 
unsatisfactory rating.  As Secretary of Education Arne Duncan put it, “Today in 
our country, 99 percent of our teachers are above average.”2
There is an obvious need for teacher evaluation systems that include a spread 
of verifiable and comparable teacher evaluations that distinguish teacher 
effectiveness.  We know from a large body of empirical research that teachers 
   
                                                 
1 Weisberg, D., Sexton, S., Mulhern, J., & Keeling, D. (2009). The widget effect: Our national failure to acknowledge and 
act on differences in teacher effectiveness. New York, NY: The New Teacher Project. 
2 Gabriel, T. (2010, September 2). A celebratory road trip by education secretary, New York Times, p. A24.  
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differ dramatically from one another in effectiveness.  Evaluation systems could 
recognize these differences but they generally don’t.  As a consequence, the many 
low stakes and high stakes decisions that are made in the teacher labor market 
occur without the benefit of formalized recognition of how effective (or ineffective) 
teachers are in the classroom.  Is there any doubt that teacher policy decisions 
would be better informed by teacher evaluation systems that meaningfully 
differentiate among teachers? 
There is tremendous support at both the federal and state levels for the 
development and use of teacher evaluation systems that are more discerning.3
The latest generation of teacher evaluation systems seeks to incorporate 
information on the value-added by individual teachers to the achievement of their 
students.  The teacher’s contribution can be estimated in a variety of ways, but 
typically entails some variant of subtracting the achievement test score of a 
teacher’s students at the beginning of the year from their score at the end of the 
year, and making statistical adjustments to account for differences in student 
learning that might result from student background or school-wide factors outside 
the teacher’s control.  These adjusted gains in student achievement are compared 
across teachers.  Value-added scores can be expressed in a number of ways.  One 
that is easy to grasp is a percentile score that indicates where a given teacher 
stands relative to other teachers.  Thus a teacher who scored at the 75th percentile 
on value-added for mathematics achievement would have produced greater gains 
for her students than the gains produced by 75 percent of the other teachers being 
evaluated. 
  
And the two national teachers unions, the AFT and the NEA, support teacher 
evaluation systems that recognize and reward excellence and improve professional 
development.  This is consistent with their long-term support of the National 
Board for Professional Teaching Standards, which is designed to identify excellent 
teachers and provide them a salary bonus.   
Critics of value-added methods have raised concerns about the statistical 
validity, reliability, and corruptibility of value-added measures.  We believe the 
correct response to these concerns is to improve value-added measures continually 
and to use them wisely, not to discard or ignore the data.  With that goal in mind, 
we address four sources of concern about value-added evaluation of teachers    
 
Value-added information vs. what you do with it 
There is considerable debate about how teacher evaluations should be used to 
improve schools, and uncertainty about how to implement proposed reforms.  For 
example, even those who favor linking pay to performance face numerous design 
                                                 
3 For instance, the Obama administration made state support of rigorous teacher evaluation systems a pre-
condition for competition in Race to the Top, and has laid out a blueprint for the reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act in which teacher effectiveness defined by evaluation of on-the-job 
performance is an important facet. 
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decisions with uncertain consequences.  How a pay for performance system is 
designed—salary incentives based on team performance vs. individual 
performance, having incentives managed from the state or district level vs. the 
building level, or having incentives structured as more rapid advancement 
through a system of ranks vs. annual bonuses—can result in very good or very 
ineffective policy.4
Similar uncertainty surrounds other possible uses of value-added information.  
For example, tying tenure to value-added evaluation scores will have immediate 
effects on school performance that have been well modeled, but these models 
cannot predict indirect effects such as those that might result from changes in the 
profiles of people interested in entering the teaching profession.  Such effects on 
the general equilibrium of the teacher labor market are largely the subject of 
hypothesis and speculation.  Research on these and related topics is burgeoning,
      
5
However, uncertainties surrounding how best to design human resource 
policies that take advantage of meaningful teacher evaluation do not bear directly 
on the question of whether value-added information should be included as a 
component of teacher evaluation.  There is considerable confusion between issues 
surrounding the inclusion of value-added scores in teacher evaluation systems and 
questions about how such information is used for human resource decisions.  This 
is probably because the uses of teacher evaluation that have gained the most public 
attention or notoriety have been based exclusively on value-added.  For example, in 
August 2010, the Los Angeles Times used several years of math and English test data 
to identify publicly the best and the worst third- to fifth-grade teachers in the Los 
Angeles Unified School District.  The ensuing controversy focused as much on 
value-added evaluation as the newspaper’s actions.  But the question of whether 
these kinds of statistics should be published is separable from the question of 
whether such data should have a role in personnel decisions.  It is routine for 
working professionals to receive consequential evaluations of their job 
performance, but that information is not typically broadcast to the public. 
 
but right now much more is unknown than known. 
 
A place for value-added 
Much of the controversy surrounding teacher performance measures that 
incorporate value-added information is based on fears about how the measures 
will be used.  After all, once administrators have ready access to a quantitative 
performance measure, they can use it for sensitive human resources decisions 
including teacher pay, promotion, or layoffs. They may or may not do this wisely 
                                                 
4 Springer, M.G., Ballou, D., Hamilton, L., Le, V., Lockwood, J.R., McCaffrey, D., Pepper, M., & Stecher, B. (2010). 
Teacher pay for performance: Experimental evidence from the project on incentives in teaching. Nashville, TN: National 
Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University. 
5 Goldhaber, D. & Hannaway, J. (Eds.) (2009). Creating a new teaching profession.  Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute. 
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or well, and it is reasonable for those who will be affected to express concerns. 
We believe that whenever human resource actions are based on evaluations of 
teachers they will benefit from incorporating all the best available information, 
which includes value-added measures.  Not only do teachers typically receive 
scant feedback on their past performance in raising test scores, the information 
they usually receive on the average test scores or proficiency of their students can 
be misleading or demoralizing.  High test scores or a high proficiency rate may be 
more informative of who their students are than how they were taught.  Low test 
scores might mask the incredible progress the teachers made.  Teachers and their 
mentors and principals stand to gain vast new insight if they could see the 
teachers’ performance placed in context of other teachers with students just like 
their own, drawn from a much larger population than a single school.  This is the 
promise of value-added analysis.  It is not a perfect system of measurement, but it 
can complement observational measures, parent feedback, and personal reflections 
on teaching far better than any available alternative. It can be used to help guide 
resources to where they are needed most, to identify teachers’ strengths and 
weaknesses, and to put a spotlight on the critical role of teachers in learning. 
Full-throated debate about policies such as merit pay and “last in-first out” 
should continue, but we should not let controversy over the uses of teacher 
evaluation information stand in the way of developing and improving measures of 
teacher performance. 
 
Some classification errors are worse than others 
Recent reports by nationally visible education researchers and thinkers have urged 
restraint in the use of teacher evaluations based on student test scores for high 
stakes decisions.  The common thread in these reports is the concern that value-
added scores reported at the level of individual teachers frequently misclassify 
teachers in ways that are unfair to teachers, e.g., identifying a teacher as ineffective 
who is in fact average.6
There are three problems with these reports.  First, they often set up an 
impossible test that is not the objective of any specific teacher evaluation system, 
such as using a single year of test score growth to produce a rank ordered list of 
  
                                                 
6 For example, a policy brief from the Education Policy Institute on the problems with the use of student test 
scores to evaluate teachers, reports that value-added estimates “have proven to be unstable across statistical 
models, years, and classes that teachers teach.”  The authors, buttress their recommendations not to use such 
scores with descriptions of research showing that “among teachers who were ranked in the top 20 percent of 
effectiveness in the first year, fewer than a third were in that top group the next year,” and that “effectiveness 
ratings in one year could only predict from 4 percent to 16 percent of the variation in such ratings in the following 
year.”  And, a report from the National Academies of Science presents a range of views on the use of value-added 
but nevertheless concludes that “persistent concerns about precision and bias militate against employing value-
added indicators as the principal basis for high-stakes decisions.”  Likewise, reports from Rand, the Educational 
Testing Service, and IES remind us to be cautious about the degree of precision in estimates of teacher 
effectiveness derived from value-added measures. 
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teachers for a high stakes decision such as tenure.  Any practical application of 
value-added measures should make use of confidence intervals in order to avoid 
false precision, and should include multiple years of value-added data in 
combination with other sources of information to increase reliability and validity.  
Second, they often ignore the fact that all decision-making systems have 
classification error.  The goal is to minimize the most costly classification mistakes, 
not eliminate all of them.  Third, they focus too much on one type of classification 
error, the type that negatively affects the interests of individual teachers.   
Imagine the simplest classification system that could be fit on a continuous 
distribution of teachers’ value-added scores: A point on the distribution is selected 
as a cut point.  Any teacher receiving a value-added score at or above that cut 
point is categorized as effective whereas any teacher with a score below that point 
is categorized as ineffective.  Imagine further that value-added is measured with 
error, i.e., a teacher’s score does not capture perfectly the teacher’s true 
contribution to student learning.  This error in measurement means that depending 
on where the cut point is placed, some truly effective teachers will be rated 
ineffective (they are false negatives) and some ineffective teachers will be rated 
effective (they are false positives). The other two classification outcomes are truly 
effective teachers so categorized (true positives), and truly ineffective teachers so 
categorized (true negatives).   
True +
False +
False -
True -
Teacher evaluation scores
#
Cut point
 
To illustrate, the figure above represents the obtained evaluation scores of two 
categories of teachers: those who are truly effective (colored grey) and those who 
are truly ineffective (colored blue).  The scores of the two groups of teachers are 
distributed normally around the mean for their group, with the spread of scores 
representing both true differences in teacher effectiveness and error in the measure 
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used for evaluation.  The cut point in the figure represents the point on the scale of 
teacher evaluation scores at which a manager chooses to treat the teachers 
differently in terms of a personnel action. Using tenure as an example, everyone 
who received an evaluation score at or above the cut point would receive tenure, 
whereas everyone scoring below the cut point would be dismissed or continue in a 
probationary status.  In this instance, the majority of truly effective teachers 
received scores at or above the cut point – they are true positives – and a majority 
of truly ineffective teachers received scores below the cut point – they are true 
negatives.  But there are also classification errors, i.e., truly effective teachers 
categorized as ineffective (false negatives) and truly ineffective teachers classified 
as effective (false positives). 
The false positive rate and the false negative rate are inversely related and 
determined by where the cut point is placed on the distribution of scores.  Thus, if 
the manager moved the cut point for granting tenure to the right in this figure, the 
false positive rate would go down whereas the false negative rate would go up.  
Likewise the true positive rate would go up and the true negative rate would go 
down.   
Much of the concern and cautions about the use of value-added have focused 
on the frequency of occurrence of false negatives, i.e., effective teachers who are 
identified as ineffective.  But framing the problem in terms of false negatives places 
the focus almost entirely on the interests of the individual who is being evaluated 
rather than the students who are being served.  It is easy to identify with the good 
teacher who wants to avoid dismissal for being incorrectly labeled a bad teacher.  
From that individual’s perspective, no rate of misclassification is acceptable.  
However, an evaluation system that results in tenure and advancement for almost 
every teacher and thus has a very low rate of false negatives generates a high rate 
of false positives, i.e., teachers identified as effective who are not.  These teachers 
drag down the performance of schools and do not serve students as well as more 
effective teachers. 
In the simplest of scenarios involving tenure of novice teachers, it is in the best 
interest of students to raise the cut point thereby increasing the proportion of truly 
effective teachers staffing classrooms whereas it is in the best interest of novice 
teachers to lower the cut point thereby making it more likely that they will be 
granted tenure.  Our message is that the interests of students and the interests of 
teachers in classification errors are not always congruent, and that a system that 
generates a fairly high rate of false negatives could still produce better outcomes 
for students by raising the overall quality of the teacher workforce.7
                                                 
7 Of course, there are many tradeoffs that belie the simple calculus in our example.  For instance, if an appreciable 
share of junior teachers were removed from the workforce in a particular district the pool of applicants might be 
too small to replace the dismissed teachers.  From a district or student’s perspective it would be better to have 
lower quality teachers in the classroom than no teachers at all.  Likewise, the calculus is not straightforward from 
a teacher’s perspective.  For example an evaluation system that identifies nearly everyone as a winner and thereby 
avoids false negatives may lessen the opportunities for advancement of stronger teachers and reduce the public’s 
support for the teaching profession. 
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effects on teachers of misclassification should be balanced by a concern with the 
effects on students. 
 
A performance measure needs to be good, not perfect 
Discussions of teacher evaluation at the policy and technical levels often proceed in 
isolation from experience and evidence from other related fields.  But we know a 
lot about performance evaluation in other labor markets, knowledge that should 
inform debates about value-added and teacher evaluation in general.  
The correlation in test-based measures of teaching effectiveness between one 
school year and the next lies between .20 and .60 across multiple studies, with most 
estimates lying between .30 and .40.8
It is instructive to look at other sectors of the economy as a gauge for judging 
the stability of value-added measures.  The use of imprecise measures to make 
high stakes decisions that place societal or institutional interests above those of 
individuals is wide spread and accepted in fields outside of teaching.   
  A measure that has a correlation of .35 from 
one year to the next produces seemingly troubling statistics in line with our 
conceptual discussion of classification errors.  For instance, only about a third of 
teachers ranked in the top quartile of value-added based on one academic year’s 
performance would appear in the top quartile again the next year.  And ten 
percent of bottom quartile teachers one year would appear in the top quartile the 
next.  Some of this instability is due to variation in teachers’ true performance from 
year to year and some of it is simply due to error in the measure. 
The correlation of the college admission test scores of college applicants with 
measures of college success is modest (r = .35 for SAT combined verbal + math and 
freshman GPA9
In health care, patient volume and patient mortality rates for surgeons and 
hospitals are publicly reported on an annual basis by private organizations and 
federal agencies and have been formally approved as quality measures by national 
).  Nevertheless nearly all selective colleges use SAT or ACT scores 
as a heavily weighted component of their admission decisions even though that 
produces substantial false negative rates (students who could have succeeded but 
are denied entry).  Why would colleges use such a flawed selection instrument?  
Because even though the prediction of success from SAT/ACT scores is modest it is 
among the strongest available predictors.  An entering class formed in part by the 
decision to admit those with higher SAT/ACT scores in preference to those with 
lower scores will perform better than a class formed without the use of that 
information.   
                                                 
8 Goldhaber, D. & Hansen, M. (2010). Is it just a bad class? Assessing the stability of measured teacher performance. 
CEDR Working Paper 2010-3. Seattle, WA: University of Washington. 
9 Camera, W.J. & Echternacht, G. (July 2000). The SAT I and high school grades: Utility in predicting success in college. 
New York, NY: The College Board.   
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organizations.10 Yet patient volume is only modestly correlated with patient 
outcomes, and the year-to-year correlations in patient mortality rates are well 
below 0.5 for most medical and surgical conditions. Nevertheless, these measures 
are used by patients and health care purchasers to select providers because they 
are able to predict larger differences across medical providers in patient outcomes 
than other available measures.11
In a similar vein, the volume of home sales for realtors; returns on investment 
funds; productivity of field-service personnel for utility companies; output of 
sewing machine operators; and baseball batting averages predict future 
performance only modestly. A meta-analysis
  
12
Despite these modest predictive relationships, real estate firms rationally try to 
recruit last year’s volume leader from a competing firm; investors understandably 
prefer investment firms with above average returns in a previous year; and 
baseball batting averages in a given year have large effects on player contracts.  
The between-season correlation in batting averages for professional baseball 
players is .36.
 of 22 studies of objective 
performance measures found that the year-to-year correlations in high complexity 
jobs ranged from 0.33 to 0.40, consistent with value-added correlations for 
teachers.  
13
We should not set unrealistic expectations for the reliability or stability of 
value-added.  Value-added evaluations are as reliable as those used for high stakes 
decisions in many other fields.  
 Ask any manager of a baseball team whether he considers a 
player’s batting average from the previous year in decisions about the present 
year. 
 
Ignoring value-added data doesn’t help 
We know a good deal about how other means of classification of teachers perform 
versus value-added.  Rather than asking value-added to measure up to an 
arbitrary standard of perfection, it would be productive to ask how it performs 
compared to classification based on other forms of available information of 
teachers.  
The “compared to what” question has been addressed by a good deal of 
research on the other teacher credentials and characteristics that are presently used 
to determine employment eligibility and compensation.  Here the research is quite 
                                                 
10 See http://www.leapfroggroup.org/, http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/, and 
http://www.qualityforum.org/Measures_List.aspx. 
11 For example, Dimick, J.B., Staiger, D.O., Basur, O., & Birkmeyer, J.D. (2009). Composite measures for predicting 
surgical mortality in the hospital. Health Affairs, 28(4), 1189-1198. 
12 Sturman, M.C., Cheramie, R.A., & and Cashen, L.H. (2005). The impact of job complexity and performance 
measurement on the temporal consistency, stability, and test-retest reliability of 
employee job performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 269-283. 
13 Schall, T. & Smith, G. (2000).  Do baseball players regress to the mean?  The American Statistician, 54, 231-235. 
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clear: if student test achievement is the outcome,14
Consider a particular example that has arisen as a consequence of the deep 
recession: the need of districts to lay off teachers as a result of budget shortfalls.  
Managers in most industries would attempt to target layoffs so as to cause as little 
damage as possible to productivity — less productive workers would be dismissed 
or furloughed before more productive workers.   
 value-added is superior to other 
existing methods of classifying teachers. Classification that relies on other 
measurable characteristics of teachers (e.g., scores on licensing tests, routes into 
teaching, nature of certification, National Board certification, teaching experience, 
quality of undergraduate institution, relevance of undergraduate coursework, 
extent and nature of professional development), considered singly or in aggregate, 
is not in the same league in terms of predicting future performance as evaluation 
based on value-added. 
Suppose school district leaders were similarly motivated and had flexibility in 
deciding how to proceed.  Imagine three possible approaches for deciding who 
should be dismissed. The first approach would employ the existing teacher 
evaluation system based on principal ratings, which identifies a few teachers as 
unsatisfactory but categorized the vast majority of teachers as satisfactory.  The 
second approach would employ teacher experience, which has been found in a 
number of studies to have a statistically significant positive association with 
student achievement.  The third approach would use teacher value-added scores to 
identify the lowest performing teachers. 
Researchers have compared these three approaches using data from fourth and 
fifth grade public school teachers in New York City and simulating the elimination 
of enough teachers to reduce the budget by 5 percent.15
 
  A graph from that study, 
reproduced below, illustrates the results for student achievement if the positions of 
teachers with the lowest value-added scores were eliminated vs. the positions of 
teachers with the least experience.  The horizontal axis is teacher effectiveness as 
indexed by student gains whereas the vertical axis is the number of teachers.  
Teacher effectiveness scores are those regularly calculated by the NYC public 
schools and could encompass teacher performance going back as far as four years. 
                                                 
14 Although student scores on standardized achievement tests are obviously proxies for rather than the actual 
student outcomes that education is supposed to generate, it is important to remember that they are strong 
predictors of long term outcomes.  For example, a large scale national study by the ACT found that eighth-grade 
achievement test scores were the best predictor of students’ level of college and career readiness at high school 
graduation —even more so than students’ family background, high school coursework, or high school grade point 
average. 
15 Boyd, D.J., Lankford, H., Loeb, S., & Wyckoff, J.H. (July, 2010). Teacher layoffs: An empirical illustration of seniority 
vs. measures of effectiveness. Brief 12. National Center for Evaluation of Longitudinal Data in Education Research.  
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
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Note that if teachers were laid off based on seniority they would be distributed 
across the full range of performance in terms of effectiveness in raising student test 
scores whereas teachers laid off based on low value-added scores would be at the 
bottom of the distribution.  In other words, many more effective teachers would be 
retained were layoffs based on value-added than were they based on seniority.  
Principal ratings, not shown in the graph, perform better than teacher seniority in 
identifying teachers with low effectiveness in raising student achievement, but not 
nearly as well as value-added scores. 
 The question, then, is not whether evaluations of teacher effectiveness based 
on value-added are perfect or close to it: they are not.  The question, instead, is 
whether and how the information from value-added compares with other sources 
of information available to schools when difficult and important personnel 
decisions must be made.  For example, keeping ineffective teachers on the job 
while dismissing far better teachers is something most school leaders, parents, and 
the general public would want to avoid.  Value-added is a better tool for that 
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purpose than other measures such as teacher experience, certification status, 
seniority, and principal ratings, even though it is imperfect.16
 
 
Conclusion: Value-added has an important role to play 
We have a lot to learn about how to improve the reliability of value-added and 
other sources of information on teacher effectiveness, as well as how to build 
useful personnel policies around such information.  However, too much of the 
debate about value-added assessment of teacher effectiveness has proceeded 
without consideration of the alternatives and by conflating objectionable personnel 
policies with value-added information itself.  When teacher evaluation that 
incorporates value-added data is compared against an abstract ideal, it can easily 
be found wanting in that it provides only a fuzzy signal.  But when it is compared 
to performance assessment in other fields or to evaluations of teachers based on 
other sources of information, it looks respectable and appears to provide the best 
signal we’ve got. 
Teachers differ dramatically in their performance, with large consequences for 
students.  Staffing policies that ignore this lose one of the strongest levers for lifting 
the performance of schools and students.  That is why there is great interest in 
establishing teacher evaluation systems that meaningfully differentiate 
performance.   
Teaching is a complex task and value-added captures only a portion of the 
impact of differences in teacher effectiveness.  Thus high stakes decisions based on 
value-added measures of teacher performance will be imperfect.  We do not 
advocate using value-added measures alone when making decisions about hiring, 
firing, tenure, compensation, placement, or developing teachers, but surely value-
added information ought to be in the mix given the empirical evidence that it 
predicts more about what students will learn from the teachers to which they are 
assigned than any other source of information.  
 
                                                 
16 Research related to this conclusion includes:  
 
Goldhaber, D. D. & Hansen, M. (2009). Assessing the potential of using value-added estimates of teacher job performance 
for making tenure decisions. Working Paper 2009-2. Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education.  
 
Jacob, B. &  Lefgren, L. (2008). Can principals identify effective teachers? Evidence on subjective performance 
evaluation in education. Journal of Labor Economics. 26(1), 101-36. 
 
Kane, T. J., Rockoff, J.E., & Staiger, D.O. (2008). What does certification tell us about teacher effectiveness? 
Evidence from New York City. Economics of Education Review, 27(6), 615-31. 
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